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There are two main forms of government in U.S. cities: council-manager and mayor-council. This
paper develops a theory of fiscal policy determination under these two forms. The theory predicts
that expected public spending will be lower under mayor-council, but that either form of government
could be favored by a majority of citizens. The latter prediction means that the theory is consistent
with the co-existence of both government forms. Support for the former prediction is found in both















There are two main forms of government in U.S. cities: mayor-council and council-manager.
Under the mayor-council form, a mayor and city council are independently elected by voters and
jointly develop policy. Under the council-manager form, policy-making power resides with the
city council. The council appoints a manager to assist in the administration of city government
functions, but this manager has no authority over policy development and can be replaced at any
time by a vote of the council.1 While some council-manager cities retain the position of mayor,
the role is typically largely ceremonial.2
This paper develops a theory of ￿scal policy determination under these two forms of govern-
ment. This theory considers a city government charged with choosing among a set of projects or
programs that could be undertaken. It assumes that the passage of projects under mayor-council
requires the support of both the mayor and a majority of council-members, whereas under council-
manager it requires the support of only the council. In addition, it assumes that voters have only
partial information about the policy preferences of candidates for city-level o￿ces. When voters
choose candidates sincerely, these assumptions imply that expected spending will be lower un-
der mayor-council than under council-manager. Moreover, this result generally remain true even
when voters are sophisticated and choose candidates accounting for the di￿erent biases of the two
systems.
The paper also uses the theory to provide a positive analysis of the choice of government form.
It shows that either form of government could be chosen by citizens in a referendum.3 Thus,
even though mayor-council leads to lower spending, it is not necessarily majority preferred. While
mayor-council may eliminate some projects which the majority oppose, it may also remove projects
which the majority support. Citizens’ choice of government form will appropriately balance these
bene￿ts and costs. In this way, the theory can explain the coexistence of both government forms
1 The mayor-council form is the traditional form of municipal government in the U.S.. The council-manager
form appeared ￿rst in 1908 in Staunton, VA and spread widely over the next half century as part of the municipal
reform movement. See Knock (1982) for a historical analysis of the spread of the council-manager form.
2 In the traditional council-manager form of government there is either no mayor or a council-member is selected
to be mayor by the council. In recent decades, many council-manager cities have chosen to separately elect a mayor.
However, in these cities the mayor typically serves on the council and has less power than his counter-part in a
mayor-council city.
3 While the process by which cities may change their form of government varies across the states, it is typically
the case that a change must be approved by a majority of city residents in a referendum. Referenda can be initiated
either by the city council or by petition of citizens.
1in U.S. cities.
The paper then investigates the theory’s prediction of lower government spending under mayor-
council form. It constructs a dataset that includes form of government and ￿scal policy outcomes
based on a large sample of cities covering the years 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, and 2002. A cross-
sectional analysis reveals that spending is signi￿cantly lower in mayor-council cities. A panel
analysis of cities that changed their form of government, also shows that spending falls (rises)
following switches to mayor-council (council-manager), relative to jurisdictions not changing their
form of government. The theoretical prediction is therefore supported. The quantitative magni-
tudes are large: the panel analysis suggests that per-capita spending is about 9 percent lower in
mayor-council cities. Assuming that this represents the causal e￿ect of government form, munici-
pal spending as a fraction of GDP would decrease by 0.16 percent if all cities in the U.S. switched
to a mayor-council form.4
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 outlines
our theory of ￿scal policy determination under the two forms of government and develops its
implications for public spending. Section 4 takes up the theory’s implications for the choice of
government form. Section 5 examines the empirical relationship between government form and
public spending, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
There is a large literature on the di￿erences between council-manager and mayor-council cities,
dating back at least to the 1960s. Not surprisingly, di￿erences in public spending across the two
forms have been a major focus. Early results were mixed, with some studies ￿nding higher spending
under mayor-council (e.g., Booms (1966) and Lineberry and Fowler (1967)) and some ￿nding lower
spending (e.g., Clark (1968) and Sherbenou (1961)). Later work tended to the view that there is no
di￿erence (e.g., Deno and Mehay (1987), Farnham (1990), Hayes and Chang (1990), and Morgan
and Pelissero (1980)). This conclusion is reinforced by the recent work of MacDonald (2008), which
4 In 2002, per-capita city government spending was about $1,000, or 2.78 percent of per-capita GDP (which
was about $36,000) and around 60 percent of cities were council-manager. Thus, our estimate implies that average
per-capita city government spending was 1037 in council-manager cities and 944 in mayor-council cities. It follows
that if all council-manager cities switched to mayor-council, average per-capita city government spending would be
944 which is 2:62 percent of per capita GDP.
2is the most sophisticated analysis to date.5 She uses a large, nationally-representative sample
of cities and tracks ￿scal policy outcomes and political institutions over two decades. Although
her main focus is on the e￿ects of the size of the city council, she also investigates the e￿ects of
government form.6 In both a cross-sectional analysis and in a ￿xed e￿ects panel analysis that is
identi￿ed by cities changing their form of government over time, she ￿nds no signi￿cant di￿erences
in government spending between mayor-council and council-manager.
This work looking at spending di￿erences has largely been atheoretical, o￿ering few arguments
for why ￿scal policy outcomes might di￿er across government forms. Early papers suggested that
council-manager cities might have lower costs because managers were professionals with training
in public administration. This neglects the fact that mayor-council cities can (and indeed do) hire
administrators with such training or select mayors with managerial skills. Another argument was
that city managers were more detached from the political process and therefore would be more
able to hold down costs. However, as Deno and Mehay (1987) point out, council-members face
political pressures and, since the manager is responsible to the council, these pressures should be
e￿ectively conveyed to the manager. Indeed, perhaps the most persuasive theoretical argument in
the literature is that, in either form, political competition should ensure that spending is in line
with the level demanded by the median voter (Deno and Mehay (1987)).
This paper advances the literature on spending di￿erences under mayor-council and council-
manager in two ways. First, it starts with an explicit theory of spending decisions under the two
government forms. The model departs from the median voter paradigm by incorporating realistic
imperfections in the political process and delivers a clear prediction about the di￿erence in size
of government under the two forms. Second, it reaches an empirical conclusion at odds with the
conventional wisdom in the literature. This is in spite of the fact that we use a very similar data
set to MacDonald. We defer discussion as to why we reach a di￿erent conclusion until after we
have presented our results.
In ￿nding empirical di￿erences between the two forms of government, our paper complements
three recent papers that identify policy di￿erences in areas other than aggregate spending. Levin
and Tadelis (2008) show that council-manager cities are more likely to privatize services than
5 We developed our empirical analysis independently of MacDonald’s paper and thank Razvan Vlaicu for bringing
it to our attention.
6 MacDonald ￿nds no relationship between the size of the council and government spending, and her results
thus challenge the ￿ndings of Baqir (2002) and others that larger city councils produce higher spending levels.
3mayor-council cities. They suggest that this result may re￿ect the explicitly political motivations
of mayors, relative to those of city managers. Levin and Tadelis also show that privatization
reduces ￿scal costs, so the fact that council-manager cities are more likely to privatize should
lower their costs. This ￿nding does not contradict ours if, as our theory suggests, council-manager
cities undertake more projects in any given service area. Enikolopov (2007) compares the policies
of council-manager and mayor-council cities with respect to public employment. He ￿nds that
the number of full-time public employees is signi￿cantly higher in mayor-council cities, while the
number of part-time employees displays no di￿erence.7 He argues that this is because mayor-
council governments are more likely to value patronage jobs than are council-manager governments.
These ￿ndings are fully consistent with those of Levin and Tadelis because privatization will reduce
full-time public employment. Vlaicu (2008) ￿nds a relatively large and statistically signi￿cant
electoral cycle in police o￿ce hiring in mayor-council cities, which is not present in council-
manager cities. This di￿erence in responsiveness is present both in a cross-sectional analysis and
in an analysis of cities that switched their form of government. Vlaicu argues that his ￿nding
re￿ects the fact that mayors have more incentive to pander to voters than do city-managers.8
A further related strand of the council-manager versus mayor-council literature is that seeking
to understand why cities adopt one or the other form. Various theories of why cities switched to
council-manager and adopted other related reforms have been o￿ered.9 These theories typically
focus on class or ethnic con￿ict. A number of papers have explored these theories empirically,
and have found little support for any of them (e.g., Dye and MacManus (1976), Farnham and
Bryant (1985), and Knoke (1982)). Rather, the main empirical ￿nding has been the importance
of regional factors: council-manager cities are most prevalent in the West and the South. Our
theory o￿ers an alternative account of why cities choose one or the other form.
Our paper also relates to a literature on presidential versus parliamentary forms of government
at the national level.10 Under a presidential form of government, the legislature and executive are
7 A number of earlier papers explored the e￿ect of government form on municipal wage levels with mixed results.
See, for example, Edwards and Edwards (1982), Ehrenberg (1973), and Ehrenberg and Goldstein (1975).
8 Vlaicu develops a two period political agency model which generates this prediction.
9 Switches to council-manager were often accompanied by switches to at-large elections for council-members and
non-partisan elections.
10 Also worth mentioning is the literature on elected versus appointed public o￿cials. This literature seeks
to understand the di￿erences in policy choices made by public o￿cials who are directly elected by the voters
and those who are appointed by other elected politicians (e.g., Alesina and Tabellini (2007), Besley and Coate
(2003), and Maskin and Tirole (2004)). Since city-managers are appointed by the council and mayors are directly
4independently elected, while under a parliamentary form, the executive is typically a member of
the governing coalition in the legislature and is not independently elected by voters. At the local
level, the mayor-council form is analogous to the presidential form, while the council-manager form
is closer to the parliamentary form. Some papers in this literature are concerned with how ￿scal
policy di￿ers under the two forms.11 Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000) examine these issues
theoretically in the context of an in￿nite-horizon political agency model.12 The government raises
taxes in order to ￿nance public goods, district-speci￿c transfers, and political rents. Politicians
are venal and care only about the consumption of political rents. Citizens are divided into districts
and each district controls (imperfectly) its own legislator via the promise of re-election. In the
basic model, which is intended to capture the behavior of a simple legislature, one legislator is
selected to propose a policy, which is implemented if approved by a majority of the legislature. In
the separation of powers model, intended to capture a presidential system, one legislator is selected
to propose a level of taxes and another the composition of spending. Separation of powers leads
to lower taxes, lower transfers, and lower political rents. Public good provision is weakly lower
and citizen welfare is higher. Thus, separation of powers leads to smaller government.13
While this paper’s theory produces a similar ￿nding to Persson, Roland and Tabellini, the
underlying mechanism is very di￿erent. Our theoretical model is static and assumes that politi-
cians have policy preferences that are not perfectly observed by voters. While voters have some
elected by the voters, it may seem that the comparison of the policies made by council-manager and mayor-council
governments falls squarely within the purview of this literature. However, it should be emphasized that o￿cially
city-managers and mayors have very di￿erent roles in the policy-making process. In a mayor-council city, the
mayor jointly develops policy along with the council. In a council-manager city, the manager is an administrator
not a policy-maker. The theory of spending decisions presented in this paper re￿ects this o￿cial distinction by
assuming that the manager has no impact on policy in a council-manager government and therefore plays a very
di￿erent role from the mayor in a mayor-council government. This said, we acknowledge that managers may have
de facto policy-making power and it may therefore be useful to apply the insights from the elected versus appointed
literature to the council-manager versus mayor-council question. Theoretical e￿orts in this direction by Enikolopov
(2007) and Vlaicu (2008) should therefore be regarded as complementary to the theory presented here.
11 See Carey (2004) for a broader overview of the literature, the bulk of which focuses on party-related issues
such as the formation of governing coalitions, votes of con￿dence, etc. These are less relevant in the municipal
context, where many elections are non-partisan (i.e., candidate party a￿liations do not appear on the ballot) and
cities are often dominated by a single party.
12 Their work builds on Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997).
13 Persson, Roland and Tabellini also analyze a third model designed to capture aspects of policy-making in
parliamentary systems that are not embodied in the basic model. To re￿ect the process of government formation,
a minimum winning coalition of legislators is ￿rst randomly selected to form a government. One legislator from the
coalition (the prime minister) then proposes a policy. This policy is implemented only if unanimously approved
by the minimum winning coalition. The unanimity requirement re￿ects the idea that the prime minister must
have the full support of his governing coalition, or a government crisis will follow. In the event of such a crisis,
policy-making reverts to the rules of the basic model. Persson, Roland and Tabellini show that in this third model,
taxes, public good provision and political rents are higher than in the separation of powers model. Citizen welfare
could be higher or lower.
5in￿uence over the policy preferences of their representatives through up-front elections, they have
no in￿uence on politician behavior through re-election incentives. The di￿culty faced by voters
is electing politicians whose policy preferences diverge from their own, rather than controlling
politicians bent on expropriating political rents. In common with Persson, Roland and Tabellini,
however, it is important that budgetary decisions require the consent of both the council and the
mayor. Thus, so-called \checks and balances" are key to the argument. In essence, both argu-
ments assume that the budgetary process incorporates checks and balances, but o￿er di￿erent
accounts of the mechanism by which these lead to lower spending.
On the empirical front, Persson and Tabellini (2003) analyze how ￿scal policies di￿er across
countries with presidential and parliamentary forms of government. They ￿nd that the size of
government is signi￿cantly smaller in nations with presidential forms. Their cross-sectional esti-
mates suggest a large reduction of about 5% of GDP and these results are robust to instrumental
variables methods, matching, and Heckman selection corrections. In a panel analysis, Persson
and Tabellini (2006) study how becoming a democracy impacts countries’ economic policies and
growth. Interestingly, they ￿nd that government spending decreases in countries who adopt a
presidential form of government, but increases in countries who adopt a parliamentary form. The
di￿erence between government spending across the two forms is remarkably similar to the 5% of
GDP estimate from their cross-sectional analysis.
Persson and Tabellini’s empirical results stand in sharp contrast to the conventional wisdom
in the council-manager versus mayor-council literature that there is little di￿erence in public
spending across the two forms. While politics at the national level is certainly more complicated
than at the local level, one might expect similar political institutions to have similar e￿ects in
both contexts. Our empirical analysis suggests that this may indeed be the case and therefore
takes a step towards unifying the presidential versus parliamentary and council-manager versus
mayor-council literatures.
3 Theory
This section presents our theory of ￿scal policy determination under the two forms of city govern-
ment. It outlines the theoretical model and derives the model’s implications for spending decisions.
It also identi￿es and defends the core assumptions of the model.
63.1 The model
The job of the city government is to choose the projects or programs the city should undertake.
There are p potential projects indexed by i = 1;:::;p. Each project i is characterized by a per capita
tax cost Ci and a bene￿t parameter Bi. Citizens di￿er in the extent to which they value public
programs. There are three preference types: high, moderate, and low, indexed by k 2 fh;m;lg
respectively. If project i is undertaken, a citizen of preference type k receives a payo￿ of ￿kBi￿Ci;
where ￿h > ￿m > ￿l. The fraction of citizens of preference type k is denoted ￿k. Both ￿h and ￿l
are less than 1=2, implying that the median voter is a moderate.
We compare two di￿erent forms of city government: council-manager and mayor-council. In
the council-manager form, project decisions are taken by an n seat city council. The council votes
whether to adopt each project, with q < n positive votes necessary for adoption. In the mayor-
council form, project decisions are made by an n￿1 seat city council and a mayor. For a project
to be undertaken, it must have q ￿ 1 a￿rmative votes in the council and the mayor’s approval.
Notice that in both forms the number of politicians is constant at n and the minimum number
of votes needed for a project to be approved is q. All that di￿ers across the forms is that, under
mayor-council, the politician who is the mayor has additional voting power.14
Under both government forms, politicians are selected by the citizens in elections. Politicians
are citizens and thus will also be either high, moderate, or low preference types. Following the
citizen-candidate approach, these preferences will govern their decision-making when in o￿ce. At
the time of the elections, citizens cannot observe how much candidates value public programs.
They do, however, observe a signal of each candidate’s preference type j 2 f￿;￿g.15 The
14 Our objective is to hold everything constant but the allocation of decision-making authority. Thus, we are
implicitly holding the size of the city administration constant as well. In our conception, when a city switches from
council-manager to mayor-council, the administrator who is the manager in the council-manager form becomes
the city’s chief administrative o￿cer in the mayor-council form. An alternative approach would be to compare
an n member council with a manager and an n member council with a mayor, under the assumption that the
mayor undertakes the manager’s adminstrative work. In this conception, when a city switches to mayor-council,
the number of politicians is increased by one at the same time the number of adminstrators is reduced by one, so
that the total number of city o￿cials (politicians plus adminstrators) remains constant. It is unclear which of these
two conceptions is the most empirically relevant. In our data, the average council size in mayor-council cities is 0:44
persons smaller than in council-manager cities, suggesting that some but not all mayor-council cities have smaller
councils. When cities switch from council-manager to mayor-council, they tend to keep the council the same size
and add a mayor. However, when they switch from mayor-council to council-manager, they tend to increase the
council by one seat. Fortunately for our purposes, the implications are broadly similar under either conception.
The details are available from the authors upon request.
15 This signal should be thought of as emerging during the campaign as a result of media coverage of candidates’
backgrounds, televised debates, campaign advertising, newspaper endorsements, etc. It should not be interpreted
as a strategic choice - otherwise, candidates would simply choose to send the signal most likely to get them elected.






h = ￿ and that ￿￿
h = ￿
￿
l = ￿ where ￿ and ￿ are positive numbers such that
￿ < ￿ < 1 ￿ ￿. Thus, candidates of signal type ￿ are more likely to be high preference types
and candidates of signal type ￿ are more likely to be low preference types. Moreover, symmetry
prevails in the sense that the likelihood that a candidate of signal type ￿ is a high preference type
equals the likelihood that a candidate of signal type ￿ is a low preference type and visa versa.
For each seat in the council and mayor’s o￿ce, there are two candidates, one of each signal type.
This electoral process is consistent with either district-based elections, in which council members
represent geographic constituencies, or at-large elections, in which all council-members represent
the entire city.16
When in o￿ce, a politician of preference type k 2 fh;m;lg will favor introducing project
i if its bene￿t/cost ratio Bi=Ci exceeds 1=￿k. Relabelling as necessary, we may assume that
projects with lower index numbers have higher bene￿t/cost ratios; that is, B1=C1 > B2=C2, etc.
Let pk denote the identity of the marginal project for citizens of preference type k; that is,
pk = maxfi : Bi=Ci ￿ 1=￿kg, and assume that 1 < pl < pm < ph < p. Under either form of
government, projects 1 through pl will be funded and projects ph+1 through p will not be funded.
The uncertainty concerns projects pl + 1 through ph. There are three possible outcomes: i) none
of these projects are funded; ii) projects pl+1 through pm are funded; and iii) all of these projects
are funded. These outcomes will depend upon the types of politicians who hold o￿ce but in a
way that di￿ers across the form of government.
3.2 Implications for public spending
Under council-manager, projects pl +1 through pm will be funded if and only if at least q of the n
elected council-members are either high or moderate preference types and projects pm+1 through






￿x) denote the probability that at least q of n elected council-members
are high or moderate preference types when x members are of signal type ￿ and n ￿ x are of
16 In our data, about two-thirds of cities have at-large council elections, and the remaining one-third have either
single-member district council elections or mixed systems with both district-based and at-large seats. The procedure
for at-large elections varies across municipalities. In some, if there are x seats up for election, each voter can vote for
up to x candidates, and the x candidates with the most votes are elected. In others, seats are numerically labeled
(i.e., Council Seat #1, Council Seat #2, etc) and candidates must choose which seat to compete for. See Dye and
MacManus (2003) for more detail. For an interesting analysis of the choice between at-large and district-based
elections see Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi (2008).





￿x) denote the probability that at least q of n elected
council-members are high preference types when x members are of signal type ￿. Then, we can




























Under mayor-council, projects pl + 1 through pm will be approved if and only if at least q ￿ 1
of the n￿1 council-members are either high or moderate preference types and the mayor is a high
or moderate preference type. Similarly, projects pm + 1 through ph will be funded if and only if
at least q ￿ 1 of the n ￿ 1 elected council-members are high preference types and the mayor is a
high preference type. Thus, we may write the expected spending level under mayor-council when
































Citizens choose the signal types of the elected o￿cials and this will determine the expected
spending levels under the two forms. The signal types they choose will depend on how sophisticated
they are in their voting behavior. We consider two polar cases. The ￿rst is that citizens simply
vote sincerely for the candidate whose favored policies they most prefer. The second is that they
vote in a sophisticated manner, anticipating the policy outcomes associated with each possible
mix of candidate types.17
3.2.1 Sincere voting
If citizens vote sincerely, high preference types will vote for candidates of signal type ￿ and low
preference types for candidates of signal type ￿. Moderates will vote for candidates of signal type
￿ if the gain in surplus they get from projects pl + 1 through pm, which we denote by G, exceeds
17 In elections for a single o￿ce holder who will be uniquely responsible for policy, sincere voting is equivalent
to voting for the candidate whose election would produce the highest expected policy payo￿. This is not the case
in legislative elections and this leads to the distinction between sincere and sophisticated voting which anticipates
how di￿erent slates of candidates will interact to generate policy. Both concepts are distinct from strategic voting
whereby voters vote to maximize expected utility and thus take into account their potential pivotality. On the
question of whether voters do in fact vote sincerely or in a sophisticated manner in legislative elections see inter
alia Degan and Merlo (2008), Fiorina (1996), and Lacy and Paolino (1998).
9the loss of surplus they experience from projects pm + 1 through ph, which we denote by L.18
If citizens vote in this way, in each race, the candidate of the signal type preferred by moderates
will win and thus all the elected politicians will either be of signal type ￿ or of signal type ￿.
Thus, either x = 0 under council-manager and (x;j) = (0;￿) under mayor-council, or x = n
under council-manager and (x;j) = (n ￿ 1;￿) under mayor-council. Importantly, citizens choice
of candidates will be the same under both government forms. It is then easy to establish:19
Proposition 1: If voters vote sincerely, expected spending is lower under a mayor-council form
of government than a council-manager form.
To understand the result intuitively, recall that projects pl+1 through pm will be implemented
under council-manager if at least q of the n elected politicians are high or moderate preference
types. Under mayor-council, this condition is necessary but not su￿cient. If it is satis￿ed but the
mayor happens to be a low preference type, projects pl + 1 through pm will not be implemented.
Similarly, projects pm+1 through ph will be implemented under council-manager, if at least q of the
n elected politicians are high preference types. Under mayor-council, this condition is necessary
but not su￿cient. If it is satis￿ed but the mayor is a low or moderate preference type, projects
pm + 1 through ph will not be implemented. The result then follows from the fact that under
mayor-council, the probability that at least q of the n elected politicians are high or moderate
preference types is exactly the same as under council-manager because voters elect candidates of
the same signal type under the two systems.
3.2.2 Sophisticated voting
The sincere voting underlying Proposition 1 is naive, because it does not take into account the
political process determining spending levels. Sophisticated voters will understand how policy
outcomes vary with di￿erent combinations of candidate types and will choose candidates accord-
ingly. While high preference voters will still prefer candidates of signal type ￿ and low preference
voters candidates of signal type ￿, moderates will sometimes prefer a mix of the two signal types
to appropriately balance the council. Moreover, the precise mix they prefer will depend upon the
form of government. The expected spending result of Proposition 1 might then be invalidated if
18 Formally, G =
pm X
i=pl+1




19 The proofs of all the theoretical results can be found in the Appendix.
10voters select more candidates of signal type ￿ under mayor-council.
Before analyzing the mix of candidates moderates prefer, we should note that they must
coordinate on which candidates to support. For example, if there are three seats and the optimal
number of candidates of signal type ￿ is two, moderates must decide in which two races they will
back type ￿ candidates. If moderates fail to anticipate correctly how other moderates are voting
and one group backs the type ￿ candidate in races 1 and 2, and another group backs the type ￿
candidate in races 2 and 3, then they might end up with anywhere from one to three ￿ candidates
elected. The analysis that follows abstracts from this problem by assuming that moderate voters
know (or correctly anticipate) who other moderates are voting for and so elect the optimal number
of politicians of each signal type.
Under council-manager, a moderate’s expected payo￿ with x council-members of signal type





















It follows that with sophisticated voting, moderates will choose xC type ￿ council-members, where
xC = argmaxfUC(x) : x 2 f0;1;::::;ngg: (4)
Under mayor-council, a moderate’s payo￿ function with x council-members of signal type ￿ and


























Moderates will therefore choose xM type ￿’s in the council and a type jM mayor, where
(xM;jM) = argmaxfUM(x;j) : (x;j) 2 f0;1;::::;n ￿ 1g ￿ f￿;￿gg: (6)
The task is now to compare spending levels under the two systems when voters select candi-
dates optimally. In particular, we wish to understand whether Proposition 1 generalizes. Before
presenting our ￿ndings, we brie￿y explain the logic of the moderates’ choice. Consider ￿rst the
problem of moderate voters under council-manager. The bene￿t of selecting an additional type
￿ council-member is that, by making the council less likely to be dominated by high preference
types, it reduces the probability of the loss L. The cost is that, by making the council more likely
11to be dominated by low preference types, it also reduces the probability of the gain G. From
(3), we see that starting with x type ￿ council-members, the bene￿t will exceed the cost (i.e.,































On the left hand side of this inequality, the numerator is the reduction in the probability that
at least q of the n council-members are high preference types created by going from x to x + 1
type ￿ politicians. The denominator is the reduction in the probability that at least q of the n
council-members are high or moderate preference types. Moderate voters will keep on raising the
number of type ￿ council-members as long as this inequality holds. Condition (7) can therefore
be used to characterize xC.
The problem of moderates under mayor-council is more complicated because it involves the
simultaneous selection of a mayor and a council. Nonetheless, for a given selection of the mayor’s
type, the problem of selecting the optimal number of council-members is similar to that under
council-manager. From (5), we see that starting with x type ￿ council-members and a type
j mayor, it will be optimal to add an additional type ￿ council-member (i.e., UM(x + 1;j) >



































Condition (8) can therefore be used to characterize xM taking as given jM. The incentives to vote
in type ￿ council-members across the two systems can be contrasted by comparing the left hand
sides of (7) and (8).
We now present:
































then expected spending is lower under a mayor-council form of government than a council-manager
form.
12Proposition 2 provides a su￿cient condition for the expected spending result to hold with
sophisticated voting. The condition requires that the ratio G=L lies outside an interval determined
by n, q, and the parameters (￿;￿). This turns out to be a very mild requirement. To see this,









Note ￿rst that, if G > L, then the condition will necessarily be satis￿ed since, by assumption,
￿ < ￿ and ￿ < 1￿￿. If G < L, on the other hand, there exist feasible combinations of ￿ and ￿ for
which the condition will not be satis￿ed. Figure 1 depicts these feasible sets for G=L equal to 0:25,
0:50, and 0:75. Evidently, when compared with the set of all ￿ and ￿ satisfying the assumptions
￿ < ￿ and ￿ < 1 ￿ ￿, these sets represent a small part of the parameter space. Moreover, for
larger values of n, the set of parameter values violating the condition is even smaller.20 Thus,
Proposition 2 can be interpreted as implying that the expected spending result of Proposition 1
will typically hold even with sophisticated voters.
The proof of Proposition 2 consists of ￿ve distinct steps. The ￿rst establishes that both
the probabilities of approving projects pl + 1 through pm and projects pm + 1 through ph are
lower under mayor-council whenever the total number of politicians of signal type ￿ elected under
mayor-council (i.e., including both council-members and the mayor) is greater than or equal to
that elected under council-manager. The second shows that if a mayor of signal type ￿ is optimal
under mayor-council (i.e., jM = ￿), then the optimal number of type ￿ council-members under
mayor-council is the same as under council-manager (i.e., xM = xC) except in one case. This is
when the entire council is type ￿ under council-manager (i.e., xC = n), in which case the entire
council is also type ￿ under mayor-council (i.e., xM = n￿1). The third step shows that if a mayor
of signal type ￿ is optimal under mayor-council (i.e., jM = ￿), then the optimal number of type ￿
council-members under mayor-council is one less than under council-manager (i.e., xM = xC ￿1)
except in one case. This is when the entire council is type ￿ under council-manager (i.e., xC = 0),
in which case the entire council is also type ￿ under mayor-council (i.e., xM = 0). The fourth
step combines the second and third steps to conclude that the only circumstance in which the
total number of type ￿ politicians under mayor-council is less than that under council-manager
is when xC = n and (xM;jM) = (n ￿ 1;￿). The ￿fth and ￿nal step establishes that a necessary
and su￿cient condition for xC = n and (xM;jM) = (n ￿ 1;￿) is that G=L belong to the interval
described in (9).
20 The most common council sizes in our dataset are 5 members and 7 members.
13The most di￿cult part of the proof is establishing the second and third steps. Here the
marginal conditions (7) and (8) are key. The second step is completed by showing that, with a
type ￿ mayor, the left hand side of (7) is exactly equal to (8) for all x 2 f0;:::::;n￿2g.21 Thus, the
marginal incentives to add additional type ￿ council-members are the same across the two forms
with a type ￿ mayor. The third step is established by showing that, with a type ￿ mayor, the left
hand side of (7) evaluated at x￿1 is exactly equal to (8) evaluated at x 2 f0;:::::;n￿2g. Thus, the
marginal incentives to add additional type ￿ council-members are stronger under council-manager
with a type ￿ mayor, but are linked across the two forms in an easy way.
Proposition 2 naturally raises the question of whether the expected spending result will fail
when (9) is not satis￿ed. The answer is not necessarily, but possibly. The Appendix presents
an example with n = 3 and q = 2 in which the parameters (G=L;￿;￿) violate (9) and the
probability of approving projects pl + 1 through pm and projects pm + 1 through ph is higher
under mayor-council. Obviously, this implies that the expected spending level will be higher
under mayor-council.
To sum up, in principle, sophisticated voting could undermine the spending di￿erence between
the two forms of government if voters select candidates who are more likely to be low preference
types under council-manager. However, the analysis suggests that this will not be the case. When
given a choice between two types of candidates, sophisticated voters typically choose to elect
the same number of each type of politician under the two forms. This re￿ects the fact that the
marginal incentives created by the two systems to elect candidates who are more likely to be low
preference types are similar. Admittedly, the model is restrictive in assuming that voters have
only two signal types of candidates from which to choose. Moreover, it is clear that introducing
multiple types of candidates would make the model very intractable. Nonetheless, the analysis
demonstrates that the spending result is at least somewhat robust to relaxing the sincere voting
assumption.
3.3 Discussion of the model
Our theory of ￿scal policy determination under mayor-council and council-manager forms of gov-
ernment makes three key assumptions. First, that candidates for public o￿ce have heterogeneous
21 The symmetry assumption that the likelihood that a candidate of signal type ￿ is a high preference type equals
the likelihood that a candidate of signal type ￿ is a low preference type and visa versa is key for this step.
14preferences over public programs which, while governing their behavior if elected, are not perfectly
observed by voters. Second, that under council-manager, programs are approved if and only if
they receive support from the required majority of the council. Third, that under mayor-council,
programs are approved if and only if they receive support from the required majority of the council
and the mayor. We now discuss and defend these assumptions.
The ￿rst assumption is necessary to generate a di￿erence between the two forms. If all politi-
cians had the same preferences or, alternatively, if voters could perfectly observe politicians’
preferences and elect only those who shared the majority preference, then the two forms of gov-
ernment would deliver exactly the same project choices.22 In our view, it seems indisputable
that politicians, as citizens, will have heterogeneous preferences over programs. Moreover, it seems
hard to believe that voters will perfectly know these preferences when they elect them. Voters
often appear surprised by the revealed preferences of national leaders, let alone city politicians.
Perhaps the best line of attack against the ￿rst assumption would be to argue that politicians,
while having di￿erent policy preferences, will not indulge these when in o￿ce because of the fear
of not being re-elected. Suppose, for example, that if voters observed anything other than projects
1 through pm being implemented, they would remove all incumbents at the next election. Then,
if the rewards from holding o￿ce are su￿ciently large, politicians would only approve projects
1 through pm under either form of government and there would be no spending di￿erence. We
have three responses to this argument.23 First, as a matter of fact, the rewards to holding o￿ce
at the city level are not large. It is not a job which comes with glamorous perks, high salary, or
signi￿cant social prestige. As reported by Ross and Levine (2006), many seats are uncontested
and, even though it is relatively easy for incumbents to get re-elected, many city council-members
serve only one term. Second, even if the rewards of o￿ce were large, the argument overstates the
power of re-election incentives. In reality, voters will not know perfectly which projects would be
supported by the di￿erent preference types. This is because the bene￿ts of many projects will be
stochastic, so that even a project which would not be supported ex ante by a voter might turn out
to yield net bene￿ts ex post. Moreover, if candidates di￿er in their initial reputations (or some
22 This conclusion would be in line with Deno and Mehay (1987) and the median voter approach to local politics
more generally.
23 See also Dye and MacManus (2003) who argue that \electoral accountability" has little direct in￿uence over
city council-members. Consistent with our model, they argue that any congruence between the views of citizens
and council-members comes from \belief sharing" (p.381).
15other characteristic such as charisma), voters will not be indi￿erent over candidates at the time
of re-election. Such heterogeneity will dampen re-election incentives because voters know that
policy decisions are determined collectively and will be unlikely to know each individual’s voting
decision. This will protect politicians with good initial reputations because they can always blame
others for the introduction of unsuccessful projects.24 Third, there is much empirical evidence to
the e￿ect that politicians follow their policy preferences even when holding o￿ces that are highly
prestigious (see, for example, Levitt (1996) on U.S. senators).
The main content of the second assumption is that the city manager has no independent
in￿uence on policy choices under council-manager. This is so even though the manager, with
the cooperation of city administrators, typically prepares the budget for the council in council-
manager cities. We see three possible justi￿cations for this assumption. The ￿rst is that the
council is able to appoint a manager who shares the policy preferences of the majority of its
members. The second is that the threat of being ￿red by the council is su￿cient to deter the
manager from indulging his preferences by omitting programs that are demanded by the majority
or adding programs that do not have majority support.25 The third is that the manager views
his professional role as implementing the policy choices of the council, rather than pursuing his
own policy preferences. Note that either of the ￿rst two justi￿cations create an asymmetry in the
relationship between council-members and the manager on the one hand, and voters and council-
members on the other. After all, we have assumed that voters can neither perfectly observe
politicians’ policy preferences nor control them ex post via the threat of re-election. However, this
asymmetry is natural because the council will be much better informed about its manager than
voters will be about their politicians.26
The third assumption is key for the spending result because it creates an asymmetry between
the blocking and passing of projects. In particular, while both the council and the mayor can
24 The relative e￿ectiveness of re-election incentives under the two government forms in a model in which
candidates have heterogeneous reputations and projects have stochastic payo￿s is an interesting (but challenging)
topic for futher study. Intuitively, the strength of the re-election incentive will be determined by how much voters
update positively or negatively after observing policy outcomes. One might conjecture that the mayor will have
stronger re-election incentives than will council-members in a council-manager system because voters know that if
a project is introduced then the mayor must have approved it. However, one must bear in mind that, if a project
is not introduced, then voters do not know whether this re￿ects the mayor or the council’s decision.
25 By all acounts, turnover among city managers is frequent and the time spent in any given city is brief. In a
sample of 120 larger council-manager cities, Ammons and Bosse (2005) found that the median completed tenure of
departing city managers was just ￿ve years.
26 We would also note that if it is the case that the manager can in￿uence policy choices in a council-manager
system, than so presumably can a city’s chief administrative o￿cer in a mayor-council city.
16unilaterally block projects, the approval of both executive and legislature is necessary to pass
projects. If we had assumed, for example, that a project was implemented unless it was opposed
by both a majority of the council and the mayor, the asymmetry would go in the other direction
and the spending result would be reversed.27
Our motivation for the third assumption comes from studying the way in which budgeting
works in mayor-council cities. A crude description of the process is that the mayor, with the
cooperation of city administrators, prepares a budget which provides a detailed list of the programs
that are to be ￿nanced. This is sent to the city council who make amendments to the budget and
approve it. While practices vary across cities, in many mayor-council governments the council can
only amend the mayor’s budget by removing support for programs.28 This process will result
in only programs that have the support of both the mayor and the majority of council-members
being approved, which is our assumption.
In reality, of course, things are more complicated than this simple description suggests, and
procedures vary considerably across mayor-council cities. In some cases, at the budget preparation
stage, the mayor may be required to obtain input from an executive committee, which can contain
key members of the council. In other cases, the council may be able to add programs to the
mayor’s budget. At the budget approval stage, the mayor may be able to selectively veto the
council’s amendments or veto the whole package. The council may then be able to override the
mayor’s vetoes with a super-majority vote.29
27 An alternative assumption would build in a status quo bias by assuming that the addition of new projects
could be blocked by either the mayor or the council, but the removal of existing projects could be blocked by either
the mayor or the council. In the language of Tsebelis (1995), both the mayor and council would be \veto players"
in the sense of being able to block change. In this case, expected spending would display more path dependence
under mayor-council, but would not necessarily be lower.
28 Unfortunately, there is no national database of city budgetary procedures, and our research was thus limited
to case studies. Examples of large cities with this budgetary procedure include Cleveland, New York, Boston,
and San Francisco. We found no cities in which the council could introduce new programs to the mayor’s budget.
See Rubin (1990) and Mullin et al (2004) for additional details. This budgetary process is also in place in a
number of countries with presidential form of governments (see Shugart and Haggard (2001)). For example, the
current Chilean constitution allows Congress to amend each spending item in the president’s budget downwards
only and disallows the transfer of funds across di￿erent programs. Baldez and Carey (1999) provide a theoretical
and empirical analysis of the impact of this constitution on policy outcomes in Chile. In their theoretical work,
they use a two player (congress and president) game theoretic model with two dimensions of spending to compare
outcomes under the Chilean constitution with what would happen under two alternative stylized constitutional
rules.
29 While the use of such selective vetos does not seem to be important in practice, if it were then our model would
still be a valid description of policy outcomes under mayor-council. The q ￿ 1 would just change from a majority
to a super-majority. However, the comparison between council-manager would change because the q used would
be majoritarian. It seems likely that such a change would make it harder to approve projects under mayor-council
and hence strengthen the result.
17Despite the rich variation in the details of the budgetary process across mayor-council cities,
we feel that the most plausible modelling assumption to make is that only those projects that
have the support of both the mayor and the majority of council-members will be implemented.30
The mayor’s role in the budget preparation process gives him/her the agenda-setting ability to
focus resources on the projects and programs that he/she supports. The fact that the council
has to approve the budget gives it the ability to strike out programs from the mayor’s wish list.
Even when the council can, in principle, add new programs, it seems natural to see its ability
to do so as somewhat constrained.31 This re￿ects three realities. First, council-members will
typically have little time to devote to crafting their own budgetary programs. Not only will the
council have a limited time period in which to respond to the mayor’s budget, but, in the vast
majority of cities, service on the council is a part-time job (see, for example, Ross and Levine
(2006)). Second, council-members will also have much less information than the executive about
the costs of di￿erent budgetary options and such information that they do have will typically be
provided by the executive. Finally, mayors often have powers of impoundment, in which they
can unilaterally withhold funds for projects that have been approved in the budget. While these
powers are designed to be used only in emergency situations, such as midyear budget shortfalls,
they have sometimes been used in order to block projects supported by the council but not the
mayor.32
4 The choice of government form
We now turn to the question of which system of government citizens would choose if they had a
referendum before city elections are held. We both derive the implications of our theory and discuss
what they imply for our empirical work. Our analysis will presume that citizens understand the
forces underlying the trade o￿ highlighted by our theory. We recognize that this may be a heroic
assumption given that the existing academic literature on U.S. cities does not o￿er a coherent
30 The diversity of procedures among municipalities make attempting to write down a detailed non-cooperative
game theoretic model of the budgetary process under the two forms of government appear rather futile.
31 In the words of Dye and MacManus (2003): \Council members do not usually serve as either general policy
innovators or general policy leaders. The role of the council is largely passive, granting or withholding approval in
the name of the community when presented with proposals from a leadership outside of itself." (p. 380 italics in
the original).
32 For example, Mayor Guliani attempted to block spending on council priorities during a 1994 budget shortfall
in New York City (New York Times, December 2, 1994).
18message on the spending di￿erence between the two forms. However, it is widely understood that
the mayor-council form embodies more \checks and balances" and our theory can be interpreted
as capturing the bene￿ts and costs of these additional checks and balances.
4.1 Implications of the theory
We begin with the case in which citizens vote sincerely in city elections. Recall that both the
probabilities of approving projects pl + 1 through pm and projects pm + 1 through ph are lower
under mayor-council than under council-manager. Thus, high preference types will always favor
council-manager and low preference types mayor-council. Moderates must trade o￿ the bene￿t
of a higher probability of obtaining the projects they like with the cost of a higher probability of
obtaining the projects they do not.
Recall that the median voter is a moderate so that which ever system preferred by moderates
will be majority preferred. To quantify the moderates’ trade o￿, suppose ￿rst that G > L so that
candidates of signal type ￿ will be elected under both government forms. A moderate’s expected
payo￿ under council-manager will therefore be UC(0) and under mayor-council will be UM(0;￿).
If G < L so that candidates of signal type ￿ will be elected in both government forms, a moderate
valuer’s expected payo￿ under council-manager will be UC(n) and under mayor-council will be
UM(n ￿ 1;￿). Di￿erencing these payo￿s, we obtain:
Proposition 3: Suppose that voters vote sincerely in candidate elections. Then, if G > L a



































￿n ￿ 1)L: (11)
To understand this result intuitively, consider the case in which G > L. The term multiplying
G on the left hand side of inequality (10) is the probability that under mayor-council, more than q
of the n￿1 council-members will be high or moderate preference types but the mayor will be a low
preference type. This is precisely the circumstance under which projects pl + 1 through pm will
be rejected under mayor-council but would not have been under council-manager. Similarly, the
term multiplying L on the right hand side of inequality (10) is the probability that under mayor-
council, more than q of the n ￿ 1 council-members will be high preference types and the mayor
19will not be a high preference type. This is the probability that projects pm +1 through ph will be
rejected under mayor-council but would not be under council-manager. Essentially, therefore, the
median voter’s choice between council-manager and mayor-council involves trading o￿ an expected
bene￿t and an expected cost. The bene￿t is that mayor-council will eliminate projects that would
be implemented under council-manager that the median voter does not want. The cost is that
mayor-council will eliminate projects that would be implemented under council-manager that the
median voter wants.
The most important point to note from this proposition is that, even though mayor-council
produces lower expected spending levels, it is not necessarily preferred by a majority of voters.
Thus, the theory can explain the fact that both government forms co-exist, which is obviously
essential given the data. It is clear from (10) and (11) that council-manager will be more likely to
be favored by voters when the surplus from projects that low preference types would remove (i.e.,
G) is high relative to the loss from projects that high preference types would add (i.e., L). It is
also clear that, when G > L and there is only a very small chance that candidates of signal type ￿
are low preference types (i.e., ￿ ￿ 0) then mayor-council dominates. For in this case there is little
chance that desirable projects will be rejected under either form of government and hence the
median voter just wants to maximize the chance that undesirable projects are rejected. Similarly,
when G < L and there is only a very small chance that candidates of signal type ￿ are high
preference types (i.e., ￿ ￿ 0) then there is no chance that undesirable projects will be approved
and the median voter just wants to maximize the chance that desirable projects are approved.
Council-manager therefore dominates.
Note that Proposition 3 assumes that moderate voters understand the di￿erence in spending
between mayor-council and council-manager when choosing the form of government but nonethe-
less vote sincerely in candidate elections. For the purposes of this exercise, therefore, it may
be more logically consistent to assume sophisticated voting in candidate elections. However, as
shown above, with sophisticated voting, except possibly in a very small part of the parameter
space, both the probabilities of approving projects pl +1 through pm and projects pm+1 through
ph, are lower under a mayor-council form of government. Thus, in choosing between the two
forms, moderate voters must again trade o￿ the same expected bene￿t and cost. All that di￿ers
is that the expectations are more complex because they depend upon voters’ endogenous choices
xC and (xM;jM).
204.2 Implications for the empirical analysis
Our empirical analysis not only investigates the theoretical prediction that ceteris paribus mayor-
council cities will have lower expected spending than council-manager cities, but also seeks to shed
light on the quantitative magnitude of any such spending di￿erences across government forms. We
do this by comparing public spending in mayor-council and council-manager cities. If there are
unobserved characteristics of cities which a￿ect both their choice of government form and their
spending levels, then this analysis will yield biased estimates.33 However, we will show here that,
if our theory correctly captures the forces leading cities to choose one or the other form, the bias
associated with the endogenous choice could go in either direction. What this means is that, if
our theory is correct, there is no a priori reason to believe that our estimate of the quantitative
magnitude of the impact of government form is biased in one or the other direction.
To see this, consider what types of changes could induce a city to switch its form of government
and the implications of such changes for spending levels. From Proposition 3, we see that an
increase in the ratio G=L could induce a switch from mayor-council to council-manager.34 To
understand what changes in the underlying environment could cause an increase in G=L, it is useful
to refer to Figure 2. The vertical axis measures project bene￿ts and costs and the horizontal axis
indexes projects. To facilitate a graphical analysis, we have assumed that there are a continuum
of projects and that the cost of each project is constant at C. The three downward lines represent
the project bene￿ts ￿kBi of the three preference types and the horizontal line the constant project
cost. The intersection of the bene￿t and cost lines determine each group’s marginal project pk.
The area G is the gain in surplus moderates get from projects pl through pm and the area L is
the loss they experience from projects pm through ph.
An increase in G=L could arise from a shift up in the moderates’ preference parameter ￿m.
This would shift the line ￿mBi to the right, increasing pm. The increase in pm would, in turn,
increase G and reduce L. Alternatively, an increase in G=L could arise from a shift down in either
33 See Sass (1991) for an explicit demonstration of this in a context in which a municipality is choosing between
representative and direct democracy.
34 From Proposition 3, we also see that the parameters ￿ and ￿ play a role in determining which form of
government citizens prefer. However, deriving the comparative static implications of changes in these parameters is
di￿cult because the probabilities in inequalities (10) and (11) are complex functions of ￿ and ￿. For example, when
G > L, as we increase ￿ we simultaneously increase the probability of electing a mayor who is a low preference
type but reduce the probability that q or more of the n￿1 council-members are high or moderate preference types.
Accordingly, we illustrate our argument with changes in the ratio G=L.
21the low or high type’s preference parameters ￿l and ￿h. A shift down in ￿l would shift the line ￿lBi
to the left and reduce pl. The reduction in pl would increase G and have no e￿ect on L. Notice
that while both these changes increase G=L, they have opposite e￿ects on expected spending.
Holding constant the form of government, a hike in ￿m will increase expected spending. This is
because it will increase the number of projects moderate politicians will implement should they
be decisive. A fall in ￿l, on the other hand, will reduce expected spending because it will decrease
the number of projects low preference type politicians will implement should they be decisive.
It follows that changes that could induce a city to switch its form of government from mayor-
council to council-manager could either increase or decrease expected spending, holding constant
government form. Thus, if the theory correctly describes citizens’ choice of government form, then
the bias arising from endogeneity could go in either direction. If the forces that lead cities to adopt
a council-manager form correspond primarily to decreases in ￿l and ￿h, then the actual increase
in the city’s expected spending will be less than implied by a random switch to council-manager.
On the other hand, if the forces that lead cities to adopt a council-manager form correspond
primarily to increases in ￿m, then the actual increase in the city’s expected spending will be more
than implied by a random switch to council-manager.
5 Evidence
This section investigates the theoretical prediction that ceteris paribus public spending will be
lower under mayor-council than council-manager. It begins by describing the data and then turns
to the econometric analysis of the relationship between government form and public ￿nances. It
also compares the results with those obtained by MacDonald (2008).
5.1 Data
Our empirical analysis uses information on political institutions, government ￿nances, and city
demographics. These three pieces of information are derived from three separate data sources.
Our data on political institutions come from the Municipal Form of Government survey, which is
conducted by the International City/County Management Association (ICMA) every ￿ve years.
In particular, we have data from survey years 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, and 2001. In each year,
surveys are sent to roughly 7,000-8,000 municipalities with response rates in any given year ranging
from 50 to 70 percent. This incomplete response rate makes the panel unbalanced. While ICMA
22mails surveys to all cities with population greater than 2,500, they only send surveys to a select
set of cities with population below 2,500. Given that this set may not be representative of all
small cities, we focus only on those cities with population in excess of 2,500.
For the cross-sectional analysis, we rely on the survey question regarding the city’s current
form of government. In addition to mayor-council and council-manager forms, a smaller number
of municipalities have either a commission, town meeting, or representative town meeting form.35
Given that over 90 percent of municipalities have either council-manager or mayor-council forms,
our analysis will ignore these other forms of government.
The panel analysis uses information on changes in government form for speci￿c cities over time.
There are two possible measures of such changes in the ICMA data. One measure compares the
form of government reported in the current survey to that in the previous survey. The other relies
on separate survey questions in which respondents are asked whether or not their city changed its
form of government in the past ￿ve years.36 For several reasons, we choose the latter measure over
the former. First, the panel is unbalanced due to an incomplete response rate, and we thus cannot
compare the current to the prior form of government for many observations in the data. Second,
according to our contacts at ICMA, the former measure overstates the true degree of switching
in government form over the past twenty years; this overstatement may be due to measurement
error associated with survey respondents in di￿erent years having disparate interpretations of the
city’s form of government.37 The latter measure, by contrast, provides a more realistic account
of the recent degree of switching in government form.
Given that we are using di￿erent measures of government form in the cross-sectional and panel
analyses, we delete observations in which these two measures are inconsistent with one another.
35 The latter two forms are found disproportionately in New England towns.
36 If so, they are also asked to report the previous and current form of government.
37 In the 2001 ICMA survey respondents are asked to indicate their city’s current form of government as de￿ned by
its charter, ordinance, or state law, and are given ￿ve di￿erent choices: mayor-council, council-manager, commission,
town meeting, and representative town meeting. Mayor-council is described as \Elected council or board serves
as the legislative body. The chief elected o￿cial is head of government, with signi￿cant administrative authority,
generally elected separately from the council." Council-manager is described as \Elected council or board and chief
elected o￿cial (e.g., mayor) are responsible for making policy. A professional administrator appointed by the board
or council has full responsibility for the day-to-day operations of the government." While these de￿nitions are
certainly correct, the fact that many council-manager cities now separately elect a mayor does create the possibility
for confusion. Direct evidence of confusion on the part of respondents comes from the large number of cases in
which cities switch form in one survey year and then switch back in the following survey year. In particular, we
found over 200 cases in the ICMA data of such double switching, and we suspect that this is evidence of confusion
rather than instances in which the city actually changed their government form twice in 10 years.
23In particular, for those cities included in the prior survey, we delete those observations in which
the respondent reported that the city changed their form of government, say, from x to y in the
previous ￿ve years, but whose form of government did not change from x in the prior survey to y in
the current survey. Likewise, we also delete observations in which the form of government changed
from x in the prior survey to y in the current survey but in which the respondent did not report a
change in the form of government over the prior ￿ve years. For purposes of clari￿cation, note that
we cannot check for internal inconsistency if the city was not included in the prior survey, and we
thus include these cities in the analysis.38 Also, since we cannot check the prior survey for the ￿rst
year of the sample, 1982, we exclude these observations from our cross-sectional analysis.39 This
process removes roughly 4,000 observations from 1982 plus about 1,000 post-1982 observations,
which represents about 7 percent of the original post-1982 dataset.
Our data on government ￿nances come from the Census of Governments for ￿scal years 1982,
1987, 1992, 1997, and 2002. We assume that the government in place during 1981 was responsible
for setting the budget for ￿scal year 1982, the 1986 government was responsible for the 1987
budget, etc. Our measure of public spending is general expenditure per-capita, which excludes
government spending on utilities, liquor stores, and insurance trusts.40 In order to make the
measures comparable across time, we convert all spending to 2002 dollars by using the CPI de￿ator.
Finally, city demographics, which are used as control variables, come from the decennial Cen-
sus. In particular, we employ three measures of citizen preferences for public spending: per-capita
income, fraction of residents with a high school degree, and fraction over age 65. To construct
city-level measures of these variables, we use GeoLytics CDs. We match the 1980 Census demo-
graphics with the 1981 political institutions, the 1990 Census demographics with the 1991 political
institutions, and the 2000 Census demographics with the 2001 political institutions.41 For the
1986 political institutions, we average the Census demographics from 1980 and 1990, and we use
an analogous procedure for computing demographics to match with the 1996 political institutions.
38 As a robustness check, we also undertook the analysis with a more conservative measure of switching which
excludes such cities. This yields very similar results.
39 This choice does not substantively a￿ect our cross-sectional results. In particular, the 1982 results are qual-
itatively similar to those in the other years of our analysis. Note also that the 1982 observations are implicitly
included in our panel analysis, since the ￿rst set of observations is based upon changes between 1982 and 1987.
40 In addition to spending measures, we have also analyzed revenue measures at the city level and ￿nd broadly
similar results. This suggests that any spending di￿erences between mayor-council form and council-manager form
are not driven by di￿erences in budget de￿cits.
41 Similarly to the government spending measures, we convert all income to 2002 dollars using the CPI de￿ator.
24Tables 1, 2, and 3 provide summary statistics for our data set. Table 1 provides a breakdown
of government form for the di￿erent years of our sample. As shown, the fraction of mayor-council
cities in the data fell from about 49 percent in 1987 to about 39 percent in 2002. As shown in Table
2, however, switching between government form by speci￿c cities is relatively rare, suggesting that
the decline in the prevalence of mayor-council form documented in Table 1 is largely due to changes
in the composition of the sample.42 In particular, we have 71 city-year observations, or less than
one percent of the sample, switching from mayor-council to council-manager, and only 32 city-year
observations switching from council-manager to mayor-council.
As shown in Table 3, mayor-council cities in our dataset do indeed spend about 15 percent
less on a per-capita basis than do council-manager cities, providing preliminary support for the
theoretical prediction. Regarding population, mayor-council cities average about 24,000 residents
and are smaller than council-manager cities, which average almost 29,000 residents. In terms of
demographics, citizens in mayor-council cities are on average older, poorer, and less educated than
their counterparts in council-manager cities.
5.2 Cross-sectional analysis
For the cross-sectional analysis, we estimate the parameters of the following regression model:
ln(Sm=Nm) = ￿1 ln(Nm) + ￿2MCm + ￿3Xm + ￿s + em: (12)
Here Sm represents government spending in municipality m, Nm represents municipal population,
MCm indicates the presence of mayor-council form relative to council-manager form, Xm repre-
sents a vector of municipality demographics, and ￿s represents a series of state ￿xed e￿ects, which
are included to capture both regional patterns in form of government as well as the responsibil-
ities of municipal governments relative to other localities.43 Finally, em represents unobserved
determinants of municipal spending. We measure the per-capita spending variable in logs in order
to reduce the in￿uence of outliers and to provide a percentage change measure of the e￿ects of
government form.
42 Indeed, when restricting the sample to those municipalities included in the sample in all of the survey years,
we see only a very small trend in the direction of council-manager form. One explanation for the trend in Table 1
away from council-manager form is that newly incorporated cities are more likely to be council-manager form.
43 As noted in Section 2.1, it is well established that there are signi￿cant regional di￿erences in the adoption of
the council-manager form.
25Table 4 reports the results from the cross-sectional analysis separately by year. As shown,
mayor-council form is associated with lower government spending per-capita and this result is
statistically signi￿cant at the 99-percent level in each year. This result is of large magnitude from
an economic perspective, with mayor-council being associated with a di￿erence in government
spending of between 8 and 16 percent. Given the summary statistics in Table 3, this represents a
di￿erence in government spending of roughly $80 to $160 per-capita on an annual basis. Regarding
other city characteristics, per-capita spending is increasing in population and in the fraction of the
population over age 65. The elasticity of public spending with respect to income is measured at
between 0.26 and 0.34 across the four years. Somewhat surprisingly, the results suggest that per-
capita spending is declining in educational attainment. This result is due to a strong correlation
(about 0.75) of educational attainment with per-capita income. When we drop income from the
regression, the coe￿cient on fraction of high-school graduates becomes strongly positive in each
of the four years, and the coe￿cient on mayor-council form is largely unchanged.
Interestingly, the measured di￿erences in government spending are stronger in magnitude in
the early years of the analysis, 1987 and 1992, relative to the ￿nal year of the analysis, 2002.
One possible explanation for this trend in the coe￿cients is a convergence in forms of government
over time. As noted earlier, council-manager cities have increasingly chosen to separately elect a
mayor. According to some sources, the power allocated to these mayors have also increased.44
Thus, the distinctions between mayor-council and council-manager form may have become less
sharp over time, and this could explain the smaller estimated di￿erence between mayor-council
cities and council-manager cities in the latter years of our analysis.
5.3 Panel analysis
We next conduct a panel analysis which focuses on changes in government form within cities over
time. The source of variation is di￿erent from the cross-sectional analysis, and thus we view these
two analyses as complementary. Our panel analysis is based upon taking ￿rst di￿erences of the
key variables in equation (12) above and estimating the following regression speci￿cation:
￿ln(Smt=Nmt) = ￿1￿ln(Nmt) + ￿2￿MCmt + ￿3￿Xmt + ￿s + ￿t + ￿emt; (13)
44 See DeSantis and Renner (2002) and Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood (2004).
26where t indexes time and ￿t is a series of survey year dummies. As reported in the ￿rst column
of Table 5, we ￿nd that switches to mayor-council (council-manager) form are associated with a
reduction (increase) in spending of just over 9 percent, relative to jurisdictions with no change
in government form in that year. Again, these e￿ects are statistically signi￿cant at conventional
levels and are large in magnitude. In contrast to the cross-sectional results above, we ￿nd that
increases in population are associated with declines in per-capita spending. We again ￿nd a
positive coe￿cient on per-capita income but ￿nd no statistically signi￿cant e￿ects associated with
changes in the fraction of the population with high school degrees or the fraction over age 65.
The regression model in equation (13) implicitly assumes that switches from council-manager
to mayor-council (￿MCmt = 1) have equal and opposite e￿ects of switches from mayor-council to
council-manager (￿MCmt = ￿1), relative to jurisdictions experiencing no change in government
form (￿MCmt = 0). We next relax this symmetry assumption by estimating the following panel-
data regression model:
￿ln(Smt=Nmt) = ￿1￿ln(Nmt) + ￿3I[￿MCmt = 1] + ￿4I[￿MCmt = ￿1] + ￿5￿Xmt + ￿s + ￿t + ￿emt:
(14)
As shown in the second column of Table 5, we ￿nd that, as hypothesized, switches to mayor-
council are associated with lower government spending and that switches to council-manager are
associated with higher government spending; the latter coe￿cient, however, is not statistically
di￿erent from zero at conventional levels. Again, both of these results should be considered
relative to jurisdictions with no changes in government form in that year (￿MCmt = 0). Also,
we can reject the null hypothesis that spending changes in similar ways following switches to and
from mayor-council form (i.e., that ￿3 = ￿4) at conventional signi￿cance levels: We fail to reject,
however, the symmetry assumption implicitly imposed in equation (13) (i.e., that ￿3 = ￿￿4) at
conventional signi￿cance levels.
5.4 Interpretation
Although the sources of variation are di￿erent, the cross-sectional and panel results both demon-
strate that, conditional on observed characteristics, spending is lower under mayor-council form,
relative to council-manager form. However, interpreting these results as supportive of the theo-
retical prediction that ceteris paribus mayor-council leads to lower spending requires additional
27assumptions. In particular, in order to interpret the cross-sectional results as causal, the key
identifying assumption is that unobserved determinants of public spending (em) are independent
of government form; that is, E(emjMCm = 1) =E(emjMCm = 0). In the panel analysis, the key
assumption is that changes in unobserved determinants of public spending (￿emt) are indepen-
dent of changes in government form over time; that is, E(￿emtj￿MCm = 1) =E(￿emtj￿MCm =
0) =E(￿emtj￿MCm = ￿1): Note that these identifying assumptions are di￿erent so that, even
though the interpretation of the coe￿cient on government form is common, the two analyses are
distinct.
If these identifying assumptions are satis￿ed, the results clearly provide strong support for the
theoretical prediction. However, we would be remiss in not acknowledging that these assumptions
may be violated due to the endogenous choice of government form. It could be, for example,
that a random switch from council-manager to mayor-council form would have no e￿ect on a
city’s spending and the econometric results just re￿ect the fact that cities that either have, or
have switched to council-manager governments, possess unobserved characteristics which generate
higher spending. While we think this is unlikely given the set of controls that we employ, we
cannot de￿nitively rule this out.
This duly acknowledged, we do feel the evidence suggests that the di￿erence in decision-making
highlighted by our theory is relevant. Given this, the next question involves the quantitative
signi￿cance of this di￿erence. After all, it would be perfectly consistent with the theory for there
to be only a very small di￿erence in expected spending levels across forms. The size of the
coe￿cients in our regressions suggest otherwise, but again the issue of endogeniety bias must be
raised. Here, however, the discussion from Section 4.2 provides some reassurance. If our theory
also correctly captures the forces underlying the choice of government form, then there is no a
priori reason to believe that our estimates of the e￿ect of a random switch to council-manager
are biased in either direction. As shown in the previous section, if the forces that lead a city to
adopt a council-manager form correspond primarily to changes in the preferences of non-centrist
groups, then the actual increase in the city’s expected spending will be less than implied by a
random switch to council-manager. On the other hand, if the forces that lead a city to adopt a
council-manager form correspond primarily to changes in the median voter’s preferences, then the
actual increase in the city’s expected spending will be more than implied by a random switch to
council-manager. Thus, assuming that our theory is correct, we have no reason to believe that
28the quantitative magnitudes of our estimates are misleading.
5.5 Comparison with MacDonald’s ￿ndings
As noted in Section 2, MacDonald (2008) uses a very similar data set and set of techniques, but
reaches the conclusion that there are no signi￿cant di￿erences in public spending across the two
forms government. We now try to shed light on why the empirical results of the two papers di￿er.
There are three important di￿erences between our cross-sectional analysis and that of Mac-
Donald. The ￿rst is that she has an expanded set of control variables, including other Census
variables, and given her more general focus on city political institutions, other political variables
from the ICMA data. The second is that she does not include state ￿xed e￿ects. The third is that
she focuses on cities with population above 10,000, whereas we use a lower population threshold
of 2,500.
In the ￿rst row of Table 6, we present results from a speci￿cation similar to MacDonald’s
baseline analysis. In addition to excluding state ￿xed e￿ects and using the higher population
threshold, this speci￿cation includes an expanded set of control variables that includes many,
although not all, of the measures used by MacDonald.45 To simplify the presentation of the
results, we only display the coe￿cient on mayor-council form.46 As shown, our speci￿cation
yields results that are qualitatively similar to those of MacDonald, and mayor-council form is
associated with a reduction in government spending only in the 1987 sample.
To isolate which of these three di￿erences in our speci￿cations is driving the di￿erences in
results, we next present results from three speci￿cations in which we begin with our baseline model
and then modify it to re￿ect each of the di￿erences between our speci￿cation and MacDonald’s.
As shown in the second row, when we use the expanded set of controls but include state ￿xed
e￿ects and use our lower population threshold, we ￿nd e￿ects on government spending that are
similar to our baseline results. Thus, the set of controls does not seem to be driving the di￿erences
in results. As shown in the third row, when we exclude state ￿xed e￿ects but use the baseline
set of controls and our lower population threshold, we again ￿nd e￿ects that are similar to our
45 In addition to our set of controls, MacDonald controlled for the size of the city council, racial heterogeneity on
the council, racial heterogeneity in the population, income inequality, fraction of council seats elected from districts,
citizen initiative / referendum, retail sales, and percent of public spending by local governments. Our expanded set
of controls includes council size, fraction black, income inequality, fraction of council seats elected from districts,
and citizen initiative / referendum. Note that MacDonald’s measure of the percent of public spending by local
governments varies only at the state-level and will thus be captured by state ￿xed e￿ects.
46 The full set of results is available from the authors.
29baseline results. Finally, as shown in the fourth row, we do ￿nd weaker e￿ects of government
form on spending when using MacDonald’s population threshold but our baseline set of controls
and state ￿xed e￿ects. With the exception of the 1992 analysis, the results are similar to those
in the ￿rst row, and mayor-council form is associated with a reduction in government spending
in only two out of the four years. Note that this statistical insigni￿cance re￿ects not only the
smaller coe￿cients but also the reduction in power associated with focusing on this subsample of
the dataset.
Our panel analysis also di￿ers from that of MacDonald in three ways. In addition to di￿erences
in the set of control variables and the population threshold, she uses a measure of switching that
is based upon comparisons of reported government form across survey years. As noted above, we
use a more conservative measure based upon whether or not cities explicitly reported a change in
form of government.47 In the ￿rst row of Table 7, we present results from a panel speci￿cation
similar to MacDonald’s baseline panel analysis. Again, to simplify the presentation of the results,
we only display the coe￿cient on mayor-council form.48 As shown, we too ￿nd no e￿ects of
government form on public spending when running a ￿xed e￿ects panel data regression similar to
MacDonald.
To isolate which of these three di￿erences in speci￿cation is driving the di￿erence in results
between our panel analyses, we again present three speci￿cations in which we begin with our
baseline model and then modify it to re￿ect each of the di￿erences between our speci￿cation
and MacDonald. As shown in the second row, when we use her measure of switching but our
baseline set of controls and our lower population threshold, we ￿nd that mayor-council form is
associated with a statistically signi￿cant reduction in government spending. But the magnitude
is much smaller than in our baseline panel analysis, which suggested a larger reduction of around
9 percent. As shown in the third row, using her expanded set of control variables only serves to
strengthen our panel results. Similarly, as shown in the fourth row, running our speci￿cation with
her higher population threshold also serves to strengthen the panel results.49
47 Note that her panel analysis includes municipality ￿xed e￿ects and thus state ￿xed e￿ects are implicitly
included. We should also note that she presents an alternative speci￿cation with no population threshhold. This
is di￿erent from our analysis, which uses a 2,500 population threshhold.
48 The full set of results is available from the author.
49 This ￿nal ￿nding is consistent with MacDonald’s analysis, where she ￿nds somewhat stronger e￿ects of council-
manager form when using the 10,000 population threshold, relative to a speci￿cation with no population threshold,
although neither of these coe￿cients are statistically signi￿cant in her analysis.
30In summary, the di￿erences in the cross-sectional results between the two papers seem to be
driven largely by di￿erences in the population threshold. This suggests that the e￿ect of form of
government is larger in smaller cities. However, in the panel analysis, our results are strengthened
by focusing on the set of larger population cities, casting doubt on this conclusion. While we
do not have any de￿nitive explanation for these population-related di￿erences between the cross-
sectional and panel analyses, it is nonetheless reassuring that our results are not entirely driven by
these small cities. Relative to MacDonald, the di￿erences in the panel results seem to be largely
driven by di￿erences in the switching measure. Her reported switching rates are much higher than
ours, and, as argued above, our measure more accurately re￿ects the recent degree of switching
in government form. Moreover, any measurement error associated with this measure of switching
may bias her estimated e￿ects of government form towards zero.
6 Conclusion
This paper has made two contributions. The ￿rst is to o￿er a theory of ￿scal policy determination
under the two main forms of government found in U.S. cities: mayor-council and council-manager.
This theory o￿ers a simple vision of how government form matters. It implies that expected public
spending will be lower under mayor-council. It also implies that either system could be chosen by
voters in a referendum. This means that the theory is consistent with the co-existence of both
government forms.
The second contribution of the paper is to empirically investigate the prediction of the theory
as regards spending. Our ￿ndings support the theory. This is a major departure from prior work,
which has come to the conclusion that there is no di￿erence in size of government under the
two forms. Independently of the forces that might be generating this result, the ￿nding suggests
an important revision to the conventional wisdom about urban public ￿nance in the U.S.. It is
also notable that the ￿nding is consonant with the di￿erence between size of government across
countries with presidential and parliamentary forms of government.
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347 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We consider only the case in which moderates prefer candidates of signal type ￿ (G > L) so that
x = 0 under council-manager and (x;j) = (0;￿) under mayor-council. The argument for the
case in which G < L is similar. Using (1) and (2), we can write the di￿erence between expected
spending under the two forms as:

























































































Substituting (16) and (17) into (15) and using the assumptions that ￿￿
l = ￿ and that ￿￿
h = ￿, we
obtain























Both terms in this expression are positive since, by assumption, ￿ and 1￿￿ are positive numbers.
￿
7.2 Proof of Proposition 2
As discussed in the text, the proof consists of ￿ve distinct steps.
7.2.1 Step 1: Comparing probabilities
We claim that mayor-council generates lower probabilities of approving projects pl + 1 through
pm and projects pm + 1 through ph, whenever the total number of type ￿ politicians is at least
35as big as under council-manager. To establish this, it is enough to show two things. First, for all






































This would show the result for the case in which, under council-manager, there are x type ￿
council-members under council-manager and, under mayor-council, there is a type ￿ mayor and








































This would show the result for the case in which, under council-manager, there are x type ￿
council-members and, under mayor-council, there is a type ￿ mayor and x ￿ 1 type ￿ council-
members.





















































































































We show that with a type ￿ mayor, xM = xC except in the case xC = n, in which case xM = n￿1.
We begin by characterizing the optimal number of type ￿ council-members under council-manager
and mayor-council with a type ￿ mayor. We then explore the relationship between the optimal
number of type ￿ council-members under the two systems.
36Optimal number of type ￿ council-members under council-manager From (7), starting
with x 2 f0;1;:::;n ￿ 1g type ￿ council-members, the bene￿t of adding an additional type ￿





















































































































































































































































































































h equal ￿ ￿ ￿. ￿
Next we show:


















































h = ￿ and ￿￿
























































h = ￿ and ￿
￿


















(1 ￿ ￿)q￿1￿n￿q =
￿q￿n(1 ￿ ￿)1￿q
(1 ￿ ￿)q￿n￿1￿q;
as required. Thus, the result is true at both ends of the spectrum.
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h = ￿
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h = ￿ and ￿￿
h = ￿
￿


















as required. The remaining cases are dealt with analogously. ￿
Finally, we show:





























￿ ￿x + 1)
:
Proof: By Claim 2, this inequality is equivalent to
￿q￿x￿1(1 ￿ ￿)n￿q￿x
(1 ￿ ￿)q￿x￿1￿n￿q￿x >
￿q￿x￿2(1 ￿ ￿)n￿q￿x￿1
(1 ￿ ￿)q￿x￿2￿n￿q￿x￿1;




This in turn is equivalent to
￿ ￿ ￿ > (￿ ￿ ￿)(￿ + ￿);
39which follows from the assumption that ￿ < 1 ￿ ￿. ￿
Combining Claims 1, 2 and 3, we may conclude that:
xC =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > <



































Optimal number of type ￿ council-members under mayor-council with a type ￿ mayor
From (8), starting with x 2 f0;1;:::;n ￿ 2g type ￿ council-members, the bene￿t of adding an




























































































































￿x + 1) =
(1 ￿ ￿￿





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































h, yields the result. ￿
Next we show:
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as required. These represent the two ends of the spectrum.
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h = ￿ and ￿￿
h = ￿
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h = ￿ and ￿￿
h = ￿
￿





















as required. The remaining cases are dealt with analogously. ￿
Finally, we show:




































Proof: By Claim 5, this inequality is equivalent to
￿q￿x￿1(1 ￿ ￿)n￿q￿x
(1 ￿ ￿)q￿x￿1￿n￿q￿x >
￿q￿x￿2(1 ￿ ￿)n￿q￿x￿1
(1 ￿ ￿)q￿x￿2￿n￿q￿x￿1;
which we already established in the proof of Claim 3. ￿
44Combining Claims 4, 5 and 6, we conclude that when jM = ￿, it is the case that:
xM =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > <



































Comparison Comparing the expressions for xC and xM, we see that













This completes Step 2 of the proof.
7.2.3 Step 3
We now show that with a type ￿ mayor, xM = xC ￿ 1 except in the case xC = 0, in which
case xM = 0. We begin by characterizing the optimal number of type ￿ council-members under
mayor-council with a type ￿ mayor. We then explore the relationship between the optimal number
of type ￿ council-members under council-manager and mayor-council with a type ￿ mayor.
Optimal number of type ￿ council-members under mayor-council with a type ￿ mayor
As noted in the text, starting with x 2 f0;1;:::;n ￿ 2g type ￿ council-members, the bene￿t of
adding an additional type ￿ council-member under mayor-council with a type ￿ mayor will exceed














































































































































l ) yields the result. ￿
Next we show:








































l )￿q￿x￿1(1 ￿ ￿)n￿q￿x
￿￿

































h = ￿ and ￿￿
h = ￿
￿































































Proof of Claim 9: By Claim 8, this inequality is equivalent to
￿q￿x￿2(1 ￿ ￿)n￿q￿x￿1
(1 ￿ ￿)q￿x￿2￿n￿q￿x￿1 >
￿q￿x￿3(1 ￿ ￿)n￿q￿x￿2
(1 ￿ ￿)q￿x￿3￿n￿q￿x￿3;




46This was already established in the proof of Claim 3. ￿
Combining Claims 7, 8 and 9, we conclude that when jM = ￿, it is the case that:
xM =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > <



































Comparison Comparing the expressions for xC and xM, we see that













This proves Step 3.
7.2.4 Step 4
From Steps 2 and 3 we may conclude that, whether a type ￿ or ￿ mayor is optimal under mayor-
council, the total number of type ￿ politicians under mayor-council is greater than or equal to that
under council-manager except when xC = n and (xM;jM) = (n ￿ 1;￿). It therefore follows from
Step 1 that mayor-council generates lower probabilities of approving projects pl+1 through pm and
projects pm+1 through ph than council-manager, except when xC = n and (xM;jM) = (n￿1;￿).
￿
7.2.5 Step 5
It remains to obtain the conditions for xC = n and (xM;jM) = (n ￿ 1;￿). From the expression
for xC derived in Step 2, we see that





￿1￿q(1 ￿ ￿)q￿n =
￿q￿1(1 ￿ ￿)n￿q
(1 ￿ ￿)q￿1￿n￿q:
Moreover, under this condition, with either type of mayor the analysis in Steps 2 and 3 tells us




























































































































































Thus, we conclude that xC = n and (xM;jM) = (n ￿ 1;￿) if and only if
￿q￿1(1 ￿ ￿)n￿q

















Thus, if condition (9) in Proposition 2 is satis￿ed, then it cannot be the case that xC = n and
(xM;jM) = (n ￿ 1;￿). It follows therefore that mayor-council generates lower probabilities of
approving projects pl + 1 through pm and projects pm + 1 through ph than council-manager and,
accordingly, lower expected spending levels. ￿
487.3 Example




















￿ ￿3) = (1 ￿ ￿)3 + 3(1 ￿ ￿)2￿









￿3) = ￿3 + 3￿2(1 ￿ ￿):





















￿ ￿2) = ￿[￿2 + 2￿(1 ￿ ￿)]:









1 ￿ ￿2 =
(0:05)(2 ￿ 0:05)
1 ￿ (0:25)2 = 0:104:









￿ ￿3) = (0:75)3 + 3(0:75)2(0:25) = 0:844;









￿3) = (0:05)3 + 3(0:05)2(0:95) = 0:007:





















￿ ￿2) = (0:25)((0:05)2 + 2(0:05)(0:95)) = 0:024:
Observe that both the probabilities that projects pl + 1 through pm and projects pm + 1 through
ph are approved are signi￿cantly higher under mayor-council.
497.4 Proof of Proposition 3
From (3) and (5) and using (16) and (17), we obtain









































Mayor-council to council-manager 0.58% (n=71)
No change 99.16% (n=12,135)
Council-manager to mayor-council 0.26% (n=32)
Mayor-council observations Council-manager observations
Government spending per-capita $867.42 $1,030.81
Population 24,001 28,714
Percent HS grad 74.74% 76.98%
log of per-capita income 9.70 9.79
fraction over age 65 14.39% 13.77%
TABLE 3: SAMPLE AVERAGES
TABLE 2: SWITCHES BETWEEN GOVERNMENT FORM
TABLE 1: PREVALENCE OF GOVERNMENT FORM OVER TIMEyear 1987 1992 1997 2002
mayor council form -0.1544*** -0.1558*** -0.1340*** -0.0833***
(0.0223) (0.0229) (0.0223) (0.0249)
log population 0.1640*** 0.1523*** 0.1312*** 0.1030***
(0.0090) (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0095)
fraction HS grad -0.2425* -0.4684*** -0.5530*** -0.4256***
(0.1342) (0.1401) (0.1450) (0.1566)
log income 0.2555*** 0.3224*** 0.3402*** 0.3047***
(0.0483) (0.0441) (0.0435) (0.0435)
fraction over 65 2.0672*** 1.4459*** 1.9624*** 1.3805***
(0.1903) (0.1874) (0.1853) (0.1860)
N 3405 3450 3016 2563
state indicators YYYY
notes: std errors in parentheses, dependent variable in logs, *** denotes significance at 99-percent level, ** at 95-percent, * at 90-percent
TABLE 4: CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSISchange in mayor council form -0.0922**
(0.0395)
change to mayor council form -0.1236*
(0.0711)
change to council-manager form 0.0780
(0.0477)
change in log population -0.3189*** -0.3191***
(0.0304) (0.0304)
change in fraction HS grad -0.0127 -0.0125
(0.1733) (0.1733)
change in log income 0.6206*** 0.6208***
(0.0597) (0.0597)
change in fraction over 65 0.2206 0.2175
(0.2866) (0.2867)
N 12238 12238
state indicators Y Y
year indicators Y Y
notes: std errors in parentheses, dependent variable in logs, *** denotes significance at 99-percent level,
 ** at 95-percent, * at 90-percent
TABLE 5: PANEL ANALYSIScontrols state FE pop threshhold 1987 1992 1997 2002
expanded no 10,000 -0.0539* -0.0461 0.0110 0.0319
(0.0308) (0.0327) (0.0292) (0.0307)
expanded yes 2,500 -0.1440*** -0.1442*** -0.1212*** -0.0740***
(0.0250) (0.0248) (0.0227) (0.0261)
baseline no 2,500 -0.1439*** -0.1258*** -0.1110*** -0.0359*
(0.0204) (0.0210) (0.0206) (0.0218)
baseline yes 10,000 -0.0562* -0.0729** -0.0394 -0.0331
(0.0291) (0.0303) (0.0302) (0.0328)
notes: each cell represents the coefficient on mayor-council form from a different regression. 
std errors in parentheses, dependent variable in logs, *** denotes significance at 99-percent level, ** at 95-percent, * at 90-percent
TABLE 6: CROSS-SECTIONAL RECONCILIATIONswitching measure controls pop threshhold coefficient
comparison across years expanded 10,000 -0.0306
(0.0216)
comparison across years baseline 2,500 -0.0364***
(0.0134)
reported change expanded 2,500 -0.1546**
(0.0633)
reported change baseline 10,000 -0.1399***
(0.0479)
notes: each cell represents the coefficient on mayor-council form from a different regression. 
std errors in parentheses, dependent variable in logs, *** denotes significance at 99-percent level, ** at 95-percent, * at 90-percent




































Figure 1a: G/L = 0.25
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Figure 1b: G/L = 0.50
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